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Abstract
Even though It is widely  recognized that giving  farmers  considered,  led neither to an  increase  in inequality  of
more secure  land rights may increase  agricultural  land distribution nor a reduction in  households'  ability to
investment,  scholars contend  that, in the case  of China,  cope with exogenous  shocks.  Household support for
such a policy might undermine the function  of land as a  more secure property  rights is increased by their access
social safety  net and,  as a consequence,  not be sustainable  to other insurance  mechanisms,  suggesting some role  of
or command broad support.  Data from three  provinces,  land as a safety net. At the same  time, past exposure to
one of which had adopted  a policy to increase  security of  this type of land right has a much larger impact
tenure  in advance of the others,  suggest that greater  quantitatively, suggesting  that a large  part of the
tenure security,  especially  if combined with  resistance to changed  property rights  arrangements
transferability  of land, had a  positive  impact on  disappears  as household  familiarity  with such rights
agricultural investment  and, within the time frame  increases.
This paper-a product of Rural Development, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to assess
the  impact of land  market  policy.  Copies  of the paper  are  available  free  from  the World  Bank,  1818  H  Street NW,
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email  address  mfernandez2@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at http://
econ.worldbank.org.  The authors may  be  contacted  at kdeininger@worldbank.org  or sjin@worldbank.org.  November
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1. Introduction and motivation
The  way in which property rights to land are defined and  documented,  the rights and obligations they
convey, and the extent to which they facilitate exchange of land through rental or sales markets,  have
far-reaching  implications  not only for the productivity  of land use but also for the  social  organization
of  communities  and  households'  ability  to  cope  with  shocks.  Land  policies  implemented  by
governments  all  over the world  aim to  strike  a balance  between  these multiple and often  conflicting
objectives.  Failure to appreciate  the multi-faceted  nature  of land rights  may lead to recommendations
that are either not acceptable politically  from the outset or, even if passed into law, may prove difficult
or impossible to implement.
Few countries  illustrate the interaction  between these equity and efficiency  goals of land policies,  and
the  need  for  such  policies  to  respond  to  a  constantly  changing  dynamic  environment,  better  than
China.  The  desire  to  change  the  social  relations  of production  and  at  the  same  time  to  boost
production,  was the driving  force underlying  the collectivization  of the late  195os. While this policy
achieved  equality in  terms of land access,  it was  associated  with a disastrous  decline  in  productive
performance  and  the  starvation  of millions  (Johnson,  1998;  Lin  and  Yang,  2000;  Putterman  and
Skillman,  1993; Yao  S.J.  1999). The desire to increase production  through higher levels of individual
responsibility  and  secure  individual  land  use  rights  culminated  in  the  adoption  of the  household
responsibility  system (HRS) in  1978. This measure,  which gave 15-year land use rights to households
proved  hugely  successful  in  terms  of production  and  did  not undermine  the basic  equality  of land
access  which  is  credited  with  helping  China  to  attain  levels  of nutritional  security  and  human
development  that  are  much  superior  to  those  achieved  by  other  countries  at  similar  levels  of
development (Burgess, 2000).With the evolution of the rural economy towards placing greater importance on investment, migration,
and non-agricultural  income  sources, there is a discussion as to whether the mechanisms that were put
in place in 1978 are still needed and/or the most appropriate.  It is often argued that the restrictions  put
on land rights, in terms of their duration as well as the scope for redistribution,  are no longer adequate
to facilitate productivity-improving  land transfers  and to bring about an adequate level of investment,
both  of which would provide  the  framework  for a dynamic  evolution  of China's rural  economy.  In
response  to  fears  fueled  by  reports  of  an  investment-reducing  impact  of  existing  land  rights
arrangements,  the  Government  has adopted  a  policy that would  give  longer  and better  documented
land  rights  to  the  rural  population.  Whether  or  not  to  proceed  more  vigorously  with  the
implementation of these measures  is an issue of considerable interest and policy relevance. To provide
a  satisfactory  answer,  it will be necessary  to look not  only at  the economic  aspects of the new land
rights  arrangement  but  also  at  social  issues  and  the  impact  of  such  a  policy  measure  on  asset
accumulation  and  factors  that  determine  its  acceptability  to  the  population.  In  this  paper,  we  use
information  generated  by a land policy  experiment,  conducted by the Chinese Government  with  the
express purpose of providing insight into these issues, to gam a better understanding  of these issues.
The policy  experiment  in question  consisted of the adoption  of directives  which,  by eliminating the
scope for periodic  redistribution and increasing  the duration  for which land  use nghts were  awarded,
provided  land cultivators  in  Guizhou  province with more  secure  land rights  than  were  available  in
neighboring provinces.  This  allows  a  "real-world"  assessment  of the impact of land policy changes
that is likely to be superior  to what can  be obtained  from hypothetical  studies that have,  up to now,
largely formed the  basis for policy recommendations  in this area.  The ability to assess the impact of
the policy  change in a number of dimensions allows us to address the complexity  of the issue and is
also more  likely to respond to the need of policy makers who,  in addition to the economic  impact of
such a measure, are concemed  about the longer-term  equity impacts  and social acceptability of such a
policy.  The  fact  that  Guizhou  is  also  one  of China's  poorest  provinces  adds  relevance  as,  in  this
environment,  other  safety nets  will be  more  scarce,  implying  that  access  to  land would perform  a
particularly important role in insuring rural households against vulnerability.  Ability to show that more
secure  land  rights  have  no  negative  impact  on  households'  ability  to  cope  with  shocks  and  are
acceptable from a social point of view in this environment would  lead one to expect similar results in
other more advanced provinces,  allowing broader applicability of the results.
The  paper  is structured  as  follows.  Section  two  provides  a  background  on Chinese  land tenure,  the
literature,  and  the characteristics  of the  land tenure  expenment  conducted  in Guizhou.  Section three
describes  the  sample  and,  as  a  first  approximation  to  measurement  of the impact  of different  land
2policies, compares descriptive statistics  across the three provinces included  in the survey.  Section four
provides  more  rigorous  econometric  evidence  with respect  to  each of the  questions  under  concern.
Section  five  draws  out implications  for further  research  as  well  as  policy  conclusions  for China  by
relating the results to recent changes in Chinese land policy.
2. The Chinese land tenure system
Ever since the collectivization of the late 1950s, the dual goals of increasing output while maintaining
broad  equality  in  access  to  resources  have  been  at  the  core  of policy  initiatives  by  the  Chinese
government.  This  section  reviews  the  recent  history  of land  relations  in  China  with  the  goal  of
summarizing  the discussion  in terms of the  advantages  and disadvantages  of more  secure  individual
property  rights.  Based on a description  of the  nature of the  policy experiment  conducted  in Guizhou
province,  we  identify  the nature of the  issue underlying  the  discussion,  and  outline  the  three main
research  questions.  These  questions  relate  to  agricultural  investment,  equity  and  human  capital
investment,  and households'  land right preferences that motivate the subsequent analysis.
2.1  Key events  and policy issues
Collectivization  of production  in China during the  1950s  had disastrous  consequences on output and
the welfare of the rural population  and led to widespread  starvation and death (Johnson,  1998; Lin and
Yang, 2000; Putterman  and Skillman,  1993; Yao S.J.  1999).  Adoption of individual  use rights to land
under the Household  Responsibility  System (HRS)  in the late  1970s and early  1980s  has contributed
to increased productivity  and output in rural areas  (Lin  1992, Lin et al.  1994,  McMillan  et al  1989).
However,  output growth flattened  in the late  1980s. Even though low  grain prices,  together with high
taxes  and  quotas,  and  the  associated  reduction  in  the  profitability  of agricultural  production  are
generally  seen  as the main variables  underlying  this  phenomenon  (Oi,  1999),  it is  widely  held that
more secure  individual land tenure arrangements could improve performance  of the agricultural  sector
and thus rural welfare in China.
Proponents  of measures  to increase tenure  security point to  three ways in which  China's  land tenure
system has limited  tenure security on the part of farmers.  One  is that the  duration of land use rights
was  limited.  Immediately  following  introduction  of the  HRS,  producers  received  land  rights  for  a
period of only  15 years. Also, there was little legal foundation to villagers'  land use "contracts",  which
were  often  only  a  verbal  agreement.  The  lack  of clear  documentation,  together  with  absence  of
independent  mechanisms  for appeal,  is assumed to have contributed to great tenure insecurity.  This is
particularly important  since,  even during the  15-year  period for  which  they  were  granted,  such  land
3use rights  were  in  many  cases  quite  insecure.  Changes  in  population  or  the  community's  need  to
obtain land for non-agncultural  purposes  such as  infrastructure  or  local enterprises  have often  led to
administrative  reallocations of land within the village. A nationally representative  survey suggests that
about  80%  of communities  experienced  at  least  one reallocation  of land  between  1983  and  1990
(Nyberg  and Rozelle, 2000).  In  1996, the  number of reallocations  experienced by an average  village
since  the inception  of the  HRS  in  the  early  1980s  was estimated  at  1.7. Decisions  on reallocations
were made in a decentralized  manner and arrangements  for govemance  at the local level seem to have
had a significant impact on the final outcome (Tumer et al.,  1998). Reports suggest that in some cases
local  cadres  may  have used  their  power  over  the  land  as  a  means  of extraction  rent  from  farmers
(Huang 1999; Johnson  1995).
In  1999,  the Chinese Govermment revisedthe  1986 Land Management  Law in order to improve tenure
security. This revision requires that all farmers receive written  30-year land use contracts  and that the
scope  for  readjustments  is  either  circumscribed  or  completely  eliminated.  Evidence  of  mitial
implementation  shows, however, that much remains to be done to translate these legal provisions  into
effective  tenure security.  A recent survey in  17 provinces found that, although 60%  of households  are
estimated  to have held written land tenure contracts,  only 13% of these contracts  rule out further land
readjustments,  25%  explicitly  allow  for  re-adjustments,  and  the  remainder  contain  unclear  or
contradictory  provisions  (Schwarzwalder  et al., 2001).  As a consequence,  only  12% of farmers  were
confident that there will be no more adjustments,  implying that the impact  of the legal provisions  on
farmers  subjective  tenure  security  has  been  limited.  Was  such  a  revision  justified?  Should  it  be
implemented  more  quickly?  These questions  are  not only relevant  in  terms of policy but have  also
been subject to considerable academic  debate.
2.2 The Guizhou experiment
To provide evidence that could help clarify these issues, and to guide the policy discussion in this area,
the Chinese Government has encouraged provinces and counties to implement  a number of land rights
"experiments".'  In  1987, Meitan county in Guizhou province was designated by the State  Council as
one  of the initial  18  national  experiment  zones for  rural reform.  The "experiment"  undertaken  there
consisted of the introduction of long-term  land use rights, prohibition  of redistribution  (initially for 20
years for paddy land), and the policy of no land readjustment in response to changes in household size.
In  1994, when the  15 year contract  (starting in 1979)  ended, the Guizhou Communist Party Committee
issued  a  document  requiring  that,  in  the  whole  province,  "the  term  of the  contract  be extended  for
another 30 years for arable land, and 60 years for non-arable  land. The policy of 'no land increase  for
4new population,  no land decrease  for reduced population'  should be continued."  At the  end of 1997,
the party  committee  issued  another  document  stipulating  that  "the  contract  term  of arable  land  be
extended for another 50 years (compared to 30 years nationally),  and the term for non-arable  land  for
another  60  years,  both  starting  with  1994."  This  policy  has  been  widely  implemented  by  giving
farmers certificates  to the land they cultivate.
Guizhou's  early implementation  of a policy  that exogenously  provides  significantly  longer and more
secure land rights than was available to farmers  in other areas of China provides an ideal case to assess
the impact  of such policies  in  comparison  to  other provinces.  To  explore  this  issue,  we  rely  on  a
household  survey that covered  1001  households  from  110  villages  in  Guizhou,  western  Hunan,  and
Yunnan  provinces.  These  provinces  were  chosen  on the  basis  of  their proximity  and  climatic  and
geographic  similarity  to  Guizhou.  The  expectation  was  that  farmers  outside  Guizhou  would  enjoy
lower levels  of tenure  security  than those within  Guizhou.  Comparing  the impact  of property  rights
arrangements  in Guizhou,  either  directly through  a  variable  indicating  whether  village  leaders  were
aware of the adoption of the "two nos" policy,  or indirectly through  a provincial  dummy,  to those in
other provinces,  provides  a  mechanism  to  ascertain  the  impact  of the  policy  on  the  vanables  of
interest.  In  addition  to the  "two  nos"  policy,  we  add  information  on  two  other  interventions  in  the
sphere of property  rights.  One refers  to villager perception  of the  transferability of land nghts within
the  village,  an  indicator  that  is justified  in  view  of recent  evidence  suggesting  the  importance  of
transferable  land nghts (Carter and Yao,  1999).  A second indicator is whether villagers  have received
written  land  use  certificates.  Before  describing  the  data.in  more  detail,  we  discuss  the  research
questions to be addressed.
2.3 Research questions
We intend to use these data to address three main questions, namely:  (i)' whether  changed land tenure
arrangements  had  an  appreciable  effect  on  agricultural  investment;  (ii)  whether  land  policy  had  a
negative  impact on equity and/or affected  households'  ability  to cope with shocks, thereby  causing  a
reduction  in their  ability  to  invest in  physical  and human  capital  or to  access  land,  and;  (iii)  what
determines  households'  preferences  for  specific  land  rights.  The  justification  for  each  of  these
questions and their relation to the existing literature is discussed below.
Agricultural investment.- A number of studies  from  China  suggest  that  tenure  insecurity  may have
affected  economic  outcomes in three ways. First, insecure  tenure was found to prevent much needed
investment  in  land  improvement  (Jacoby,  Li,  and  Rozelle,  2001),  something  that  may  have  had
l  Note  that these were not randonized expenments  and that no systematic  evaluation of the impact was undertaken.
5particularly negative  consequences  on former "wasteland"  (Hanstad et al.  1998). Although  less direct
and  systematic,  there  are  indications  that  lack  of tenure  security  contributed  to  environmentally
unsustainable  methods  of cultivation  and overexploitation  of natural resources  (Simil  1999; Nyberg
and Rozelle, 2000).2  Second,  the literature points to the fact that insecure tenure reduces the possibility
of productivity-enhancing  land  transfers  in the  rental market  and may  result  in under-utilization  of
land,  especially in areas where rural non-farm employment is economically important (Liu, Carter and
Yao,  1998).  This  is  often  believed  to  have  led  to  economic  inefficiencies  because  absence  of land
markets permitted  a fragmented  land holding  structure  (Chen and Davis, 1998).  Finally, to the extent
that land rental  is  seen as a signal  for a household  not needing its allocation  of land, it would tend to
reduce  out-migration  of households  which  would benefit  both the migrants  and the  those who  stay
behind (Yang,  1999). Taken together,  these  factors have  led to calls for policy-makers  to consolidate
and streamline reforms  (Oi,  1999),  and especially  to strengthen  households'  property  rights over land
(Prosterman  and Hanstad,  1998).  Identifying the  differences in land rights either through a provincial
dummy or a direct indicator of whether or not the village had adopted the "two no" policy allows us to
assess the impact of the change  in land tenure  regime. As the survey asked specifically for agricultural
investments undertaken  during  different  time periods,  we should be able to capture  a  wider range  of
investments  than  has been  available  to  other  studies  which  often  considered  only  very  short  term
investments.
Equity, investment, and land access: It is undisputed  that in  rural  areas  of China, as  in  many other
transitional  economies,  access  to  land  is  a  critical  determinant  of household  welfare  which,  by
contributing  directly  to home production  and consumption,  also helps to reduce vulnerability.  This is
of  particular  importance  when,  for  cost  and  administrative  reasons,  a  social  welfare  system  is
impossible to implement.  The remarkable  equality of opportunity that is established  by the possibility
of having periodic reallocations of land is often seen as a key reason for China's ability to attain higher
levels  of nutritional  security  and  human  development  than  other  countries  at  similar  levels  of
development  (Burgess,  2000).  Although,  with  an  egalitarian  distribution  of endowments  in  place,
markets  could,  in principle, help to re-allocate  land in response to changes in family structure  caused
by births,  out-migration,  and deaths, it is often maintained  that continued provision of administrative
re-allocation will be needed for equity reasons  (Dong,  1996). If this were the case,  i.e.  if the inability
to redistribute  land in response to population  change that is associated  with the award of more secure
tenure would reduce  the ability of the poor  to cope with shocks,  the equity gains might outweigh  the
2 Rigorous  assessment of the impact of shocks  on changes  of household consumption  in the short term will require data on consumption  that
are collected  with greater  frequency  In  the absence of such data, we  can use changes  in asset endowments and  explore the extent  to which
there  are  significant  differences  across  provinces  in households'  strategies  to cope  with  shocks,  somethmg  that could  point towards  a
detnmental impact of land tenure in this respect
6efficiency losses and on balance it may not be worth moving towards more secure tenure even if more
secure land nghts increase households'  propensity to make investments.
To explore,  whether,  once an equitable  initial  allocation of land  has been achieved,  providing more
secure  long-term  rights  to land  will  negatively  affect  equity,  we  explore  to  what  extent  there  are
systematic  differences  across  provinces in  changes  of household  asset endowments  over  time.3 One
possibility is that population  change by itself has led to a worsening of the ownership and operational
distribution of land.  A second  and more  likely hypothesis  is that households that experienced  shocks
dunng the period  have, possibly  due to a lack of access  to land,  had lower levels of investment.  Both
possibilities can be tested in a regression framework.
Household land right  preferences: Farmers'  preferences  in terms of land rights are of interest over and
above the observed differences  in outcomes because  in a decentralized  system it is unlikely  that any
policy can be successfully implemented unless it is supported by a majority of the local population. To
explore this issue, we assess the  extent to which  households'  preferences  over different types of land
rights  are  affected  by  differences  in  relative  endowments;  the  ability  to  access  other  markets,
especially  those  for  insurance  and  credit;  and the fact  that they actually  experienced  the  "two nos"
policy regime. Identification of the extent to which endowments and access to markets for credit and
insurance  affect land right preferences  allows us to asses the extent to which market imperfections not
only persist but also reduce the benefits  from better defined land rights for individual households. This
could  be  used  to  identify  complementary  policy  measures  that  could  contribute  to  a  higher
acceptability  or better  distribution of the gains  from  well-defined  property  rights.  Identifying  factors
that affect farmers'  preferences  will  allow one to better appreciate  the complexity of such rights and,
by assessing the likely  future evolution  of exogenous variables,  also help to predict  the likely change
in  preferences  resulting  from  broader  economic  development.  In  addition,  finding  a  significant
positive  impact  of past  adoption  of a  specific  land policy  measure  would  point  towards  a  learning
effect,  the magnitude of which can be compared to the impact of other factors. A significant literature
building  on hypothetical  questions  has  emerged  and largely  finds household  opinion to  be strongly
against a  policy of "no redistribution"  (Kung  1995;  Kung and Liu  1997;  Brandt  et al.  2001).  Even
though  our  sample  is  not nationally  representative,  it  is  based  on  real  life  experience  rather  than
hypothetical  questions and allows detailed  assessment of the interaction  of various  factors and market
imperfections  in shaping  such preferences.  This allows us to avoid situations  where  interviewees  fail
3If  this were the case, one would  have to ask whether the efficiency gains of such a move would  be large enough  to potentially compensate
those who lose out and whether, at the local level, mechanisms exist to actually implement such compensation
7to comprehend  the implications  of a hypothetical  situation  which they have  not actually experienced
themselves and,4 as a consequence,  exhibit a strong bias towards the status quo.
3. Data sources and descriptive evidence
This  section  describes  the  sample  and nature of the  data  used  in subsequent  analysis  by presenting
descriptive  statistics  on  household  characteristics  and  changes  in  the  inequality  of endowments,
investment,  shocks, and coping strategies,  and preferences regarding  land rights.  We find that, despite
differences  in sources  of income,  and  especially  the extent of migration,  means of most  household
characteristics  such as  income  levels are  quite  similar  across provinces  in the  sample.  Investment in
enterpnse  assets  and consumer  goods  was the  most prevalent,  and  even  though  a  large  number  of
households  reported  exposure  to  shocks,  these  did not  contribute  to  an  appreciable  increase  in  the
inequality of land endowment.  Also, we  find that support  for the  policy of no redistribution  is high,
especially in the provinces where this policy had been implemented before.
3.1  Characteristics of the sample
The data used in the study are from a combined village and household  survey conducted by the Rural
Survey  Team  from  China's  State  Statistical  Bureau  (SSB)  in  May  and  June  of 2001.  The  survey
covered  1001  households  from  10  villages  in three  of China's poorest  provinces  with  significant
differences  in land  tenure  arrangements,  namely  Guizhou,  western  Hunan,  and  Yunnan  provinces.
Guizhou  province  was  chosen  because  it  had  implemented  the  "two  nos"  policy  early  on  while
western  Hunan and Yunnan were chosen because of their proximity and their climatic  and  geographic
similarity to Guizhou.  Thus, the provinces have simnilar geographic  and other characteristics  but differ
significantly in their  land tenure arrangements  which were changed by provincial  decree in Guizhou.
We thus  expected to find that farmers  outside this province  would not enjoy the same level of tenure
security than those within Guizhou.
In  addition  to most  of the  vanables  included  in  standard  multi-purpose  surveys  such  as  household
characteristics,  expenditure,  assets,  different  income  sources,  and  agricultural  production,  the survey
contained a number of modules that aimed to re-construct movements  in population  and key assets. To
do  so,  information  on  individuals'  employment  history,  their  investment  in  productive  agricultural
assets, non-farm enterprises,  consumer durables (including housmg), and changes in land endowments
4In  many situations,  households  opted  for  administrative  redistnbution  of land  as  a  means  to shift  land  that had  been  left uncultivated
because  of out-migration to  other users  (Kung and Liu 1997).  The fact  that administrative redistnbutnon,  rather  than a decentralized  market
mechanism, was quoted  as the mechanism of choice could  be a reflection of respondents'  lack of famihanty with  the scope  for operation  of
markets and the way they work
8was obtained retrospectively  for the time period starting in  1980. Similar information was obtained  on
the occurrence of shocks, households'  responses to these shocks and their coping strategies.5 To obtain
information on key  village  characteristics,  a village  level  questionnaire  was  administered  to village
leaders, with a significant part of the information being obtained from village books.
3.2 Household  and village  characteristics
Income size and composition: The households  included in the sample are  very similar with regard to
total  or per  capita earned  income,  defined  as the sum  of wage income  and profits  (excluding  family
labor) from agriculture and non-agricultural  enterprises. As illustrated in table 1, this figure amounts to
between  Y  1116  in  Guizhou  and  Y 1468  in Hunan,  clearly  identifying  all of the households  in the
sample  as very poor  (table  1).6 Despite  some diversification  of income  sources, agricultural  income,
i.e.  profits  from  crop  and  livestock  production,  still  accounts  for  more  than  two  thirds  of earned
income, varying from less than 69% in Guizhou to more than 74%  in Yunnan. Other characteristics  for
households  in the sample are fairly  similar. For example, Guizhou has the largest family size, with 4.5
members  per  family,  compared  to  4.13  in  Hunan  and  4.22  in  Yunnan.  Village  characteristics,  as
reported  in  table  2,  point  not  only  towards  differences  in  overall  size  but  also  to  differences  in
population  growth.  The  mean  annual  rate  of population  growth  (from  1985  to  2000)  was  1.1%  in
Guizhou  and Yunnan,  but only 0.4%  in Hunan.  At the same time, the villages  in the sample have by
now virtually universal access to electricity.
Inter-generational  links: Although  overall levels  of earned  income  and household  characteristics  are
similar across provinces, the composition of such income and the extent to which households are  able
to complement it with remittances differs across provinces.  The survey indicates that, for the majority
of  households,  remittances  from  farmly  members  who  had  migrated  out  and  inter-generational
transfers are of great importance. For those who receive them, remittances  increase non-earned income
by more than  50%. With 44% percent of households receiving  remittances  in the aggregate,  regional
differences  are  considerable;  the share of households  receiving  remittances  ranges  from  almost two
thirds  in  Hunan  to  one  third  in  Yunnan.  On  the  other  hand,  providing  resources  for  household
members who have left the household, mainly  for education,  constitutes a significant burden - almost
two thirds of households  provide support for off-spring and for those who do so, the mean amount of
support given is equal to 25% of earned income.
3.3 Land rights arrangements and preferences
5  Obtaining this  retrospective information proved fairly easy in practice
6 Even though Hunan  is much ncher than the other two provinces,  limiting the sample  to the mountaineous  part in  the west of  the province
implies that per capita incomes are very similar
9We  are  interested  in  three  interrelated  though distmct types  of land right interventions,  namely  the
extent  to  which  the  "two  nos"  policy  has  been  adopted,  whether  households  have  been  awarded
certificates  that document their  land holdmgs,  and whether or not land rental is allowed.  Concerning
the adoption of the "two no" policy,  we observe  clear differences  between Guizhou and the other two
provinces. In Guizhou,  93%  of all villages report not having taken any action following an increase  in
population,  as  compared to less than  half of all villages  (43%  and 48%, respectively),  in Hunan  and
Yunnan.  Coverage  with  certificates  (at  the  household  level)  is  almost  complete  in  Guizhou7 and
Yunnan,  compared  to about two thirds  in Hunan, suggesting  that certificates  can be and are awarded
even in cases where tenure is of a shorter term nature and redistribution remains  a possibility.
Village  leader  as  well  as  mdividual  household  responses  to  the  question  of whether  land rental  is
allowed  or  not  points  towards  considerable  divergence  between  official  policy  and  household
perception but at the same time also suggest that the "two nos" policy is neither a precondition for -nor
even highly correlated  to- availability of transfer rights. Surprisingly,  the share of villages  where land
rental is officially allowed is highest in Hunan, even though this is the province with the least amount
of penetration  of certification  and  the  "two nos"  policy.  According  to  village  leader  responses,  the
percentage  of villages  allowing  land rental  ranges  from between  almost 80%  for  Hunan to  39%  for
Yunnan.  Villagers' views are quite different, suggesting that households may be less aware  of existing
restrictions  on land rental than village  leaders assume or that these rules  are either difficult to enforce
or not recognized.  While  villagers'  relative  ranking of provinces  is  consistent with  the  information
given by village leaders, the share of households who believe that rental is allowed is, with 90%, much
higher than what has been indicated by leaders.
To obtain information on preferences  for land rights, the survey also asked households  to rank 4 types
of land policies  in descending  order.  The first is the  "two nos" policy, i.e. no readjustment  m response
to either population  increase or  decrease together with an enhanced  duration of land rights of at least
30  years.  The  second  option  is  a  policy  of  continuing  "small  adjustments",  i.e.  administrative
reallocation of land from households  who experienced  population decrease  to those whose  population
increased while leaving others'  land endowments  unchanged.  The third option  is a "large adjustment"
policy  whereby  land  is  completely  redistributed  among  all  households  m  the  village  based  on
population size every  3 to 5 years. The  final policy  option is one of a "big adjustment  followed by a
7 Following provincial  policy, certificates held by villagers in Guizhou specify a contract term that extends  from 1994 to 2043,  i e. exactly 50
years  The  reason  for  back-dating  contracts  to  1994  is  that  this was  the year  in  which  the first  round of 15-year  contracts  following  the
adoption  of the  HRS in 1979 was  supposed  to have ended, despite  the fact that, as  is evident from our survey,  most villages  completed  the
initial round of land allocations  only in the early to mid 1  980s
10two  no  policy"  where  land  is  redistributed  to  establish  an  egalitarian  landholding  structure  before
imposing the "two nos" policy and longer-term tenure security.8
Descriptive  evidence  on farmers'  first preferences  indicates  that there  is  indeed considerable  support
for the policy of "two nos". Either immediate imposition of the "two nos" policy or implementation of
a  large adjustment  that is then followed  by the  "two nos"  policy is  supported by about two  thirds of
households  in  Guizhou  (68%)  and Yunnan  (64%)  but only  42%  in Hunan.  Most of the  households
(45%  in Guizhou and 43%  in Yunnan) prefer to have the  "two nos" directly, without going through  a
redistribution beforehand.  Continuing  large adjustments,  arguably the policy that undermines property
rights the most,  is preferred  only by a very  small minority of households  (7%  in Guizhou,  14%  and
13%  in Hunan  and Yunnan)  while  small  adjustments  are  the first preference  of between  one fourth
(24% in Guizhou;  28% in Yunnan) to almost one half (44% in Hunan). To assess the policy relevance
of these  figures  it is  important to assess  the extent to which they might be nationally  representative.
The nation-wide  study by Schwarzwalder  et al. (2001)  broadly supports our findings for the provinces
where there is an overlap (72%, 63% and 67% of households  m Guizhou, Yunnan,  and Hunan who do
not oppose  a policy of "two nos")  and, in addition,  points towards a high  level of support for stable
land  distribution  nation-wide,  though this  support is slightly higher  in poor provinces.  Interestingly,
even though this survey finds that support for the "two no" policy was slightly higher in Guizhou than
in other provinces,  this study finds that support for such a policy in Guizhou is only about 10%  higher
than  the  average  for  the  eight  poorest  provinces  (Guizhou,  Yunnan,  Hunan,  Jiangxi,  Jlim,
Heilongjiang,  Guangxi,  and  Shaanxi),  clearly  too  little  to  argue  that this  policy  might  have been
imposed  endogenously in Guizhou. While  definitions are  slightly different,  this is at variance  with an
earlier  study by Kung and Liu (1997)  who, based on a smaller and geographically  more  concentrated
sample,  found  62%of  households  to  be  in  favor  of  periodic  redistnbution.  Exploring  the
methodological  and  substantive  reasons  underlying  such  differences  in  more  detail  would  be  an
important area for future research.9
3.4 Investment,  shocks,  and coping strategies
To  gain  insight  into  how  exogenous  land  right  arrangements  affect  households'  choice  of asset
portfolio,  we  distinguish  between  investments  in  agriculture,  education,  and  non-agricultural
enterprises.  Table  4  illustrates  that  the  most  frequent  type  of investment  is  in  consumer  durables,
8 Prosterman et al  (2000) claim that such a policy has significant support in many rural areas of China
9 A  study of  Meitan,  the  county where  the  onginal  policy  expenment  had  been  conducted  (Kung  forthcoming),  finds  evidence  for  a
significant  decline in support for a policy of no reallocation  and a level of support for a policy of no readjustment which, with about 32%,  at
present,  is  less than half of what emerges from our survey  This draws  attention to the fact  that changes  in the property nghts regime will
have distnbutonal  implications  in addition  to their impact on efficiency  Differences  in sampling are a pnme candidate for such vanation in
results  To the extent that our sample  is  a true random  sample of the population in  the  provinces  to be covered  (as  compared  to only one
county in the case of Kung), we are reasonably confident with respect to  the accuracy of the numbers obtained.
11especially  housing,  followed  by  investment  in  agricultural  enterprises  (including  land)  and  non-
agricultural  enterprise  assets.  About  one  third  of the  households  included  in  the  sample  (36%  in
Hunan,  33%  in Guizhou,  and 24%  in Yunnan)  undertook  agricultural  investment  during  the 5 years
before the survey (i.e.  from 1996-2001),  compared to about two thirds in all provinces  who invested in
consumer goods  and housing.  Two other strategies to increase  income in the future  are investment  in
children's  education  and  out-migration.  The  data  show  slight  differences  in  education  of the  most
recent group of children graduating  from primary  school (i.e. those between  15 and 20 years of age m
2000), with the  highest values  attained in Hunan,  followed  by Guizhou  and Yunnan (5.5,  5.8  and 4.9
years,  respectively).  Regarding  current  migration,  one  observes  significant  differences  between
household heads and children.  Migration is highest in Hunan.
One of the most important reasons for households to disinvest or to reduce their equilibnum holding of
durable  assets  is  either  in  response  to  or  in  anticipation  of shocks,  given  the  type  of safety  nets
available. To the extent that differences  in land rights arrangements  imply a systematic change  in the
possibilities  to  smooth  consumption  in  response  to  population-related  shocks,  one  would  expect
households'  optimum  portfolio  to  adjust  both  ex  ante (i.e.  irrespectively  of whether  a  shock  was
actually experienced,  depending  only on the specific  land right arrangements)  as well as  ex post for
those households  who  experienced  a  shock.  To  provide  a  first indication of the extent to  which  we
would expect changes in land rights to have an impact on the ability to deal with risk, we need to hold
constant  for  other  factors,  in particular  the  strength  of the  borrowing  network  and  whether  or not
respondees  experienced  an actual shock.  To  approximate the former in an environment  where access
to formal credit is restricted,l'  interviewees  were asked about the number of people  from whom they
could borrow  amounts ranging  from Y 1,000  to Y  10,000."1  For the latter,  information  was gathered
on whether,  during  the  last  5 years,  households  had experienced  any of a  number of shocks,'2 the
approximate  magnitude of the shock in monetary  terms,  and the coping  strategy  adopted to deal with
the situation.
Table 4 contains descriptive  statistics for both variables.  The  average household had 2.1  friends who
could  be  approached  in  order  to  borrow  amounts  between  Y  1,000  and  Y 5,000,  with  significant
differences  between  Guizhou  where  this  figure  was  highest  (2.4)  and  Hunan  and  Yunna  (1.7).
Responses to small shocks involving  a loss of between Y 1,000 and 5,000 and large shocks,  defined as
i° Our data suggest that the amounts  received  from formal sources of credit  were tiny (consistently  below Y 500)  and that access  was quite
limited with only 33% of household having had a formal loan any time dunng the last  1995-2000 penod
" Interviewees  were  able  to provide quite  precise  answers  to  this  question.  For higher amounts  there  was,  however, a  misunderstanding
(some understood  enumerators  to ask for the number of people  they would have  to ask to borrow  a total of Y 10,000 rather than those who
could provide them with this amount in one go. We therefore  focus on lower amounts where the information appears  to be better
12 These shocks  include crop  faiiure, loss of livestock  through  death,  disease, or  theft,  illness or death of a  family  member,  damage to  the
house or other assets, loss of wage eaming opportunities,  and sigificant expenses for mamages  and funerals.
12those with a value of more  than Y 5,000, point towards  informal borrowing  and migration as the most
common coping strategies - applied by about 60% and 35% respectively.  Compared to this, the share
of households  who chose to reduce consumption or to sell assets was, with less than 9%, modest. Also,
descriptives  fail  to  substantiate  fears  that the implementation  of the  "two  nos"  policy  in  Guizhou
would  have undermined  households'  ability to draw  on existing  safety nets as a way  to cope with
shocks.  In  fact,  of  all  the  households  included  in  the  sample,  dis-investment  or  reduction  of
consumption was,  with 2%  and 0%  (compared to 5%  and  9%  and 7%  and 6%  in Hunan and Yunnan)
least observed in Guizhou.
Inequality: To obtain an  indication of the distribution  of land  in the villages, we asked village leaders
for  the  share  of households  with  more  than  double  or less  than  half of the  average  village  land
endowment.  Responses  indicate  that  land  distnbution  is  most  unequal  in  Yunnan,  followed  by
Guizhou and Hunan but that there  were only limited changes  over time. This evidence  is supported by
data  on  individual  land  endowments  for  households  included  in  the  sample.  The  data  pomt  to
differences  in the mean per capita  endowments  and the structure of landholdmgs  across provinces.
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Comparing  the  distribution  of  income  and  land  holdmgs  highlights  that,  in  all  provinces,  the
distribution of land is more equal than the distnbution of income; income Gini coefficients  are 0.50 in
Hunan,  0.48  in Guizhou,  and  0.49 in Yunnan while the Gini  coefficient for total  land area  is 0.33  in
Yunnan,  0.38  in Guizhou,  and 0.42 in Hunan. As households  were asked about the evolution of their
land holding over time, we can test for systematic differences  in the evolution of land inequality across
the three provinces.  Doing so does not reveal any significant differences,  thus allowing us to reject the
hypothesis of the "two nos" policy having led to a systematic  worsening of land holdings.
4. Econometric evidence
This  section contains  econometric evidence  concerming the three main policy questions of interest. We
first explore  the extent to which land rights affect investment  in agriculture and,  through the impact on
households'  ability  to cope with shocks,  would possibly affect human capital accumulation  and non-
agricultural  enterprise investment.  Evidence  indicates  that more secure land rights and higher levels of
transferability  increase  producers'  propensity  to  mvest  in  agriculture.  Households  who  experience
shocks  reduce non-agricultural  investments  as well  as  the level  of schooling of children  who make
their  educational  decisions dunng  the time period  of the  shock. At the same time there  is no evidence
13  The natural endowment is most favorable  in Hunan. In this provmce, relatively large areas of paddy land (0 75 mu per capita as compared
to  0.31  mu  in  Yunnan  and  0 4 mu in Guizhou) are available,  virtually all  households  (80% as  compared  to 31%  in  Guizhou  and 24% in
Hunan) are able to access waste land and the area available is much larger  (1.1  mu as compared  to only slightly more than 0 1 mu in the other
two provinces,  and forest  is more plentiful (3 22 mu as compared to 2 5 mu in Yunnan  and 0.48 mu in Guizhou).
13that differences  in land rights  arrangements  had any impact  on the  ability to cope with  these shocks.
Although  many of the  factors  affecting  households'  land nght preferences  are  as predicted,  what is
most surprising is the evidence  of "learning"  whereby  households  who experienced  more stable  land
rights are likely to favor them.
4.1 Agricultural investment
The  impact of land  tenure  arrangements  on  households'  propensity  to  invest is  widely  seen  in the
literature as a test of the investment-enhancing  impact of higher levels of tenure security (Feder et al.,
1988;  Besley  1995,  Li  et  al.,  1998).  With respect  to China,  most applications  focus  on  short term
investment.  Without data on long-term investment,  many studies have resorted to short-term measures
such as the use  of specific  inputs  such as  fertilizer  or  organic  manure.'4 Also,  to the extent  that the
observed  vanation  in tenure  secunty  is  endogenous,  i.e.  adopted  in response  to higher  payoffs  from
land-improving  investments,  it may suffer from biased estimates.  Both of these shortcomings  can be
addressed  with  our  data.  First,  we  have  data  on  long-term  investment.  Second,  the  fact that  laws
affecting tenure security in Guizhou were made at the provincial level, provides exogenous variation in
tenure  security.  To the extent  that more secure property  rights  (such  as the  policy of the  "two nos")
have been adopted in other villages  outside Guizhou where the benefits from such a policy would be
particularly  high,  the  econometric  estimates  of the impact  of this  arrangements  as  obtained  by our
study would provide  a lower bound of the true effect.
To  make  inferences  on  determinants  of household  investment,  we  use  a  specification  that  follows
Feder  et  al.  (1987)  where  overall  levels  of  agricultural  investment  are  a  function  of  household
characteristics,  in  particular  endowments  and  access  to  credit  markets  and  other  mechanisms  for
smoothing consumption,  and policy variables.  In addition,  as farmers'  investment decisions  are likely
to  depend  on  the aggregate  level  of investment  undertaken  by the village,  we  include  village  level
investment  as  one  of the right  hand  side  variables  and  adopt  a  two-stage  approach.  Formally,  we
estimate
(1)  J, =a+XI*,+6X,+  yZ,+  P,  +ei
where 1',  is either (m the probit specification)  a dummy equaling one if household  i made investments
in agriculture during the period and zero otherwise  or (in the tobit specification)  the actual amount of
investment made. Xi are vectors of household  characteristics,  Zi are endowments  of labor and land and
Pi are land policy variables.  Agricultural  investment used for this study include households  investment
1'  To the extent that  these "investments"  may Just compensate  for failure to  investment in the past (possibly due to low tenure secunty) or are
correlated  with soil quality, a factor that is generally unobserved,  doing so can give nse to erroneous conclusions
14in  land  improvement,  such  as  establishment  of wells,  digging  of ditches,  planting  of orchards  and
trees, and other forms of soil improvement as well as livestock-related  investments.
Dong (2000) and others have argued that individual households  make their investment decisions based
on  the  aggregate  level  of investment  in  the  village,  implying  that  failure  to  include  village  level
investments  may  introduce  significant  bias.  To  address  this  issue,  we  use  instrumental  vanable
techniques.  Village  level investment,  I,  is the endogenous vanable and identifying instruments are the
lagged value of village  investment  in the previous 5-year  period, the share of upland in the village's
total  land endowment,  average per capita income,  and the population  growth rate from  1985-95.  The
first is a proxy  for the overall  propensity  to invest  in the village,  the  second  identifies the scope  for
productivity-enhancing  investment  by  converting  upland,  the  third  indicates  the  scope  for  cross-
subsidization  of agricultural  investment  from  non-agricultural  sources,  and  the  rate  of population
growth highlights  the need for more investment at the village level to maintain a given living standard.
Results,  presented  in table  5, support the conjecture  that secure  land use rights increase  agncultural
investment  by individual  households.  Irrespectively  of whether the  impact of more  secure land nghts
is proxied by the provincial  dummy for Guizhou or whether  we include  an  explicit vanable indicating
whether  or not the village had adopted  a policy of "two nos", probit and  tobit regressions  suggest a
significant  and  positive  impact  of more  secure  land  rights.  The  Guizhou  dummy  is  consistently
significant  at  least  at  10%  and  very  positive;  in  the  equation  with  the  policy  dummy,  both  are
significant.  This  suggests  that  households  in  Guizhou  or  in  villages  which  adopted  the  "two  nos"
invested more  in agriculture  than those  in the other provinces  or in villages where this policy was not
in effect.  While no such effect is  visible on paddy land only,"5 the increased tenure security  on upland
which was afforded by the "two no" policy appears  to have induced  a significant response in terms of
agncultural investments.
At the  same  time,  the  regressions  suggest  that secure  land  ownership  rights  are not the  only policy
variable of relevance;  to the  contrary,  whether  or not a household  is able  to transfer land is found to
have  a  bigger  impact  on  investment  than  the  adoption  of the  two  nos policy.  The  importance  of
transfer rights is intuitive because high levels of tenure  secunty will not be very useful if such security
is contingent on  self-cultivation  by the  household.  Transfer rights  will be of particular  importance  if
there is a reasonable  chance that the household  (or its children)  will be able to obtain an off-farm job,
similar to the  findings  by Yao  (2001). This suggests  that, without being  able to transfer  land, higher
levels of tenure  security will only have a modest impact on increased investment.
I5 Regressions  where only investment on paddy land is considered  yield  consistently insignificant results
15Coefficients  for  other  variables  are  largely  as  expected.  The  instrumented  village  level  investment
variable is weakly positive, suggesting that village and individual level investment tend to complement
each  other.  By comparison,  past  (individual)  agricultural  investment  is  clearly  negative  both in  the
probit and the tobit specification,  highlighting that household  who undertook such investment recently
are  less  likely  to make  further  investment  in  agriculture.  Also,  other household  characteristics  and
endowments have the expected signs: households'  labor endowment is associated with higher levels of
relatively  labor-intensive  agricultural  investments.  While  paddy  land  endowments  are  marginally
significant,  the  high  significance  of  "other"  land,  i.e.  orchards  and  wasteland,  illustrates  that,
everything  else  constant,  availability of such lands  greatly  increases  the scope  to  make  agricultural
investments, especially  in planting trees. Households who have children migrating to off-farm job are
less  likely  to  invest  in  their  land,  suggesting  that  investment  in  non-agricultural  pursuits  such  as
education and out-migration  can substitute for investment in agriculture,  possibly due to higher returns
to  migration  as  compared  to  on-farm  investment.'6 Thus,  while  we find  a  significant  and  positive
impact  of the  Guizhou  dummy or  the decision  to  implement  a policy  of "two  nos",  the regression
suggests  that  a  number  of  other  variables,  especially  transfer  rights,  have  a  quantitatively  more
important impact on investment.
4.2 Coping with shocks
Even though descriptive  statistics suggest that the change in land policy had only limited or no effect
on  the  coping  strategies  employed  by  households,  econometric  exploration  that  controls  for  other
factors  is needed to provide  more  rigorous  evidence.  To explore  whether the  change  in land policy
affected  households'  levels  of investment,  we  focus  on  human  capital  investment  as  well  as  net
investment  in  enterprise  equipment  and  consumer  durables.  Following  Feder  et  al.  (1997).  The
reduced form equation to be estimated is of the form
(2)  Pi =  a+,6Xi + r9, + ec
For the case  of educational  investment,  4,  the outcome  variable of interest, indicates  the number  of
years  of education completed  by childj in household  i, Xi, is a vector  of household  and individual-
specific characteristics  that may affect childj's education decision including provincial dummies,  t, is
a  dummy indicating  whether or not the  household  experienced  a small  or large shock during  1995-
2000,  and the  interaction  of this variable  with  provincial  dummies  to  indicate  different  land tenure
regimes,  and  ei  is  an  error term.  Investment  in  education  or non-agricultural  equipment  could  be
affected by land right arrangements  in two ways. While  there  is scope  for Ex post, the ability  to gain
16 This also implies that credit constraints are unlikely  to be a major impediment preventing  agricultural  investment - if they were we would
16access  to  additional  land  may  increase the likelihood  od  households  who experienced  shocks  to be
compensated.  On  the  one hand,  households  who  have experienced  a  shock  may be  more  likely  to
obtain land.
We consider  "small shocks",  those  involving  a monetary  loss of between  Y  1,000 and Y 5,000,  and
"large  shocks",  those  implying  a loss  of more  than  Y 5,000.  As  we  are interested  in the  impact of
shocks that affected households'  ability to invest in education  during the 1995-2000 period, we restrict
ourselves  to educational  decisions by children that were between  10 and  15  years of age during that
time.'7 Variables  relating  to  household  and  individual  characteristics  include  the  mean  level  of
education  achieved by  the child's parents,  his or her gender,  the household's  land endowment,  and a
dummy for whether  or not the household  head or any siblings had migrated out during  the period of
interest. Age dummies are included throughout.
Replacing  Y1i with C,,  the amount of net investment  in non-agricultural  enterprise assets  and consumer
durables  during  the  last  period  (i.e.  1995-2000),  leads  to  a similar  equation  for  net  investment  in
physical  capital. In this  case,  the  dependent  variable comprises  net investment by the household,  i.e.
total  investment  minus  any  assets  lost  through  an  exogenous  shock  during  the  1995-2000  period.
Implementing  this  is relatively  easy  as  households  reported  the  approximate  monetary  loss  (e.g.  in
spending  on  hospital  fees  and  medicine)  due  to  a  shock.  We  do  not  make  any  provisions  for
depreciation.
Results  of the education  equation  for 258 children  in the applicable  age  group are reported  in Table
6.18  In  general,  large  shocks  are  indeed estimated  to have had  a significant  and quantitatively  large
negative  impact  on  children's  education.  Having  experienced  a  large  shock  is  estimated  to  have
reduced  a child's level of educational  attainment by two thirds of a year  (column  1),  a value  that is
large if compared with  the average attainment of 4.5 years within the sample. To explore whether  the
ability to cope with shocks differs across provinces, e.g. because the introduction of the two nos policy
deprives  households  of access to land which  they have traditionally used  as a safety net,  we interact
the shock variable with regional dummies. Doing so indeed  points towards differences  in the ability to
smooth  consumption  across provinces (table  2). However,  contrary to what one might have expected,
households  in  Guizhou  are  apparently  able  to  deal  with  shocks  better  than  those  in  the  other two
provinces.  The t-tests presented at the bottom of table 6 indicate that, while  in all cases shocks had a
expect households to subsidize agnculture  through earmings from off-farm employment.
17  Another reason for focusing on this age group is that educational progress  beyond primary school,  i.e. over 9 years, depends on intellectual
ability  more  than on  household  characteristics.  Thus,  only  decisions  up  to the  completion  of primary education  are strictly  a household
decision
" Use of household  fixed  effects  was  impractical  due  to the fact that  the vast majonty of households  had only  one child  that completed
schooling  during this time penod.
17significantly negative impact on household  provision of education for their children in Hunan,  it is not
possible to reject the hypothesis that shocks had no effect in the case of Guizhou  and Yunnan.  In fact,
households in Guizhou who were subjected to large shocks responded by increasing rather than cutting
back  on  the  educational  investment  in  their  children's  future.  This  allows  us  to  clearly  reject  the
hypothesis  that  limitations  in  households'  ability  to  deal  with  shocks  (which,  in  turn,  might  be
associated  with  the  adoption  of the  two  nos  policy)  had  an impact  on  human  capital  investments.
Results thus support the notion that, consistent with what emerged from the descnptive  analysis, there
is little reason to expect land nghts to have a significant impact on households'  coping strategies.'9
Other  variables  in  the  human  capital  investment  model  are  largely  as  expected.  The  positive  and
significant coefficient  of the  male dummy in all four models points towards  a continuing  strong bias
against girls in providing education,  something that is markedly different  from other countries such as
the Philippmes  (Quisumbing  et al.  2000)  but not too  uncommon  for  Chma (Dreze  and Saran  1994).
Parents'  educational  attainment,  defined  as the  mean  years of schooling  completed  by both parents,
has  a  significant  and  positive  impact  on  children's  education;  one  additional  year  of schooling
increases  the  level  of children's  education  by 0.12  years.  The  importance  of parental  education  on
children's  education  in  China  is  also  supported  in  the  relevant  literature  (Knight  and  Li,  1996).
Outmigration  of the household  head is shown to have a significant and negative impact on children's
attainment,  suggesting  that  parental  presence  is  an  important  input  into  the  education  production
function.  While households'  land endowment  is positive,  it is not significant,  suggesting  that neither
land  policy  nor  land  endowment  have  a  systematic  impact  on  the  level  of education  obtained  by
households'  offspnng.
Tobit regressions  for  investment  in physical  capital  and  consumer  durables,  as reported  in  table  7,
point in the  same direction.  We find that, after controlling  for other factors such as  age (negative), the
number of household  members,  and the household's  level of education  (both highly positive), shocks
reduced  both the  probability of a household  making positive  net investments  (probit models) and the
magnitude of net positive investment  (tobit models).  This  is true for both large and small  shocks. At
the same time,  and similar to what was found for human capital accumulation,  the results suggest that,
if anything,  households in Guizhou  are better able to cope with shocks than their compatnots in other
provinces.  It thus appears very  unlikely that the land policies adopted  in this province  had a negative
effect on households'  ability to smooth consumption.
4.3 Land right preferences
19  Tests  for  the presence  of a  systematic  difference  in households'  patterms  of land accumulation  or a  systematically  different  impact  of
exogenous  shocks  on  the  land accumulation  pattem  across provinces  (not  reported)  yield  similar  conclusions  In  all  cases,  the  Guizhou
dummy or its interaction  with the shock vanable remains insignificant.
18If,  as  suggested  by the evidence  presented  above,  more  secure and  transferable  land rights  increase
households'  propensity to invest but neither are  associated  with  a more  unequal  distribution of land
nor  a  significant  decrease  in  their  ability  to  cope  with  shocks,  one  would expect  that  the  average
household  would  be in  favor of more  secure  land  rights  and  that rejection  of the  "two nos"  policy
would be related to differences  in the ability to smooth consumption,  the endowments  owned, or past
experience of this policy. To explore determinants  of preferred tenure arrangements,  we define  vectors
of household  characteristics  (X) that affect the  ability to smooth  consumption and ensur  against nsk,
endowments  of labor  and  land  (Z)  that  will  have  an  impact  on  the  ability  to  make  land-related
investment  and the expected  household-specific  benefits or losses  from  a specific  land tenure system
as well as policy variables (P) to run a probit regression  of the form
(3)  P, = a + ,X,  + yZ, + 6P,  + e,
where' 7, is a dummy equaling  1 if household  i prefers tenure regime P (j  1..4) and zero otherwise,
a, f,  y,  and 3 are coefficients to be estimated,  and e, is an iid error term.
The  rationale  for  specific  variables,  together  with  the  results  from  the  preference  regressions  thus
specified in  table 8,  are  discussed below. We  focus on results for households who chose  the two nos
policy  (with  and  without  village  level  adoption  of this policy  as  a  right hand  side  variable),  to be
complemented by those in favor of other policy options.  The coefficients reported  are marginal effects
at  the  mean  of all  other  variables  and  standard  errors  have  been  adjusted  using  the  Huber-White
heteroskedasticity consistent estimator throughout.
Households' endowments: Preferences  for or against redistribution  are likely to be affected by the way
in which such action  will  change  households'  land endowments,  in particular  whether  a households
current  endowment  is  above  or  below  the  endowment  expected  after  redistribution.2 0 Thus,
endowment  variables  will be  of obvious  importance.  Under  the assumption  that only  paddy  land  is
subject  to redistribution,  we would expect households with higher levels of per capita endowments  of
paddy  land (relative  to the village  mean) to be less  in favor of policies that allow for redistnbution in
the future.  At the same time,  greater dependence  on agriculture is likely to increase the payoffs  from
long-term investment  in land,  thus leading households  to favor the  two nos policy.  Preferences  for or
against  administrative  land  allocation  are  also  likely  to  be  affected  by  household  structure.  In
particular,  children who were  born  "without  land"  after the  initial  land  assignment  during the  HRS
would allow a household to stake a claim for obtaining  more land in any future redistribution and are
thus expected to predispose households  against the two nos policy.
20 taking away from those with high levels of per capita land and  giving to those with little,  the current  level of land access  is likely to affect
preferences  for or against redistribution
19Contrary  to the expected importance of per capita land endowments,  we find that these varnables  are
only weakly  significant at the  10% level.  Total per capita land has the expected positive sign but the
endowment of upland relative to the village mean is negative. The share  of income from agriculture is
highly significant and positive,  suggesting that it is particularly households  who depend on agriculture
and who  thus benefit most from higher investment  incentives  who appreciate  the increased  stability
and investment  incentives  conveyed  by this policy.  In line with expectations,  households  with a large
number of children who were born  after the  initial land  reallocation  are against the "no reallocation"
policy as an  adjustment would provide them with additional  land. By the  same logic, higher numbers
of elderly members  lead households  to favor the  "two nos", policy because  the land that belonged to
these  people  would  have  to be  given  up  in the  reallocation  followmg  their  death.  One  more  adult
member  increases  the propensity by  3.5%  while another  old member is estimated to result in a 6.6%
increase in the probability of having stable land nghts under the two nos policy as the most preferred
policy  option. By contrast, one  additional  member in the  10-14 age group that was  likely to be "born
without  land"  after  the  finalization  of allocations  under  the  HRS  around  1983/84  and  that is  now
coming into productive  age, decreases  the propensity towards the two nos by 4.8%.
Credit access and insurance:  A  second set of variables  relates to a household's  ability to  self-msure
and  smooth  consumption.  These  include  the level of per capita  income, the number of children  who
migrated  out, whether remittances  were received  from other family members,  and the  strength of the
informal  borrowing network available  to the household  defined  as the number  of people  from whom
an  amount  of Y  1,000-5,000  could  be  borrowed.  Variables  related  to  credit  market  access  and
consumption  smoothing are of importance if periodic administrative  reallocation of land functions  as a
safety net. We expect that households  who have access  to other,  and possibly less costly, mechanisms
to provide  insurance  would  be more  in favor  of an efficiency-enhancing  redefiition  of land rights.
The main mechanisms  for doing so are the ability to self-insure  due to high  levels of asset ownership
or income  and the presence of social  networks. To measure  the latter, we include mdicators relating to
the size of a household's  informal borrowing  network,  the number of children who have married out
and  can  thus provide  a  source  of remittances,  as  well  as  the actual  amount of remittances  received
during the last year.
Indeed,  we find that the opportunities  for consumption  smoothing provided by higher levels of income
significantly  affect households'  preferences  m favor  of more  stable land use  rights.  Social networks,
mainly  in the form of children  who have migrated out  to establish their  independent  household,  are
also  of great  significance  while  the  scope  for  informal  borrowing,  i.e.  the number  of people  from
20which  the  household  could  informally  borrow  Y  1,000-Y  5,000,  is  significant  only  at  10%.21
Companng  the  number  of children  who  have  migrated  out  to  the  (insignificant)  actual  receipt  of
remittances  suggests that the option of drawing on social  support in the future, rather than the actual
receipt of income, is the relevant criterion.  All of this supports the hypothesis that,  as overall  levels of
income  and the scope for non-land related  mechanisms  of insurance  increase,  a policy of stable  land
use nghts will be favored by an increasing  share of households  in China.
Policy variables: Finally, we include three sets of policy variables  in P relating to the receipt of a land
use certificate,  whether land rental is allowed in the village, and whether or not the village had adopted
the two  no  policy  in  1995.22  One justification  for this is  that,  if households  "learn"  in  the sense  of
adjusting their expectations about different policies  in light of earlier  experience,  one would expect to
find  systematic differences  in preferences  between  households  who  experienced  the policy of "two
nos"  (or  those  who  received  land  tenure  certificates)  and  those who  did not.  A  second  possibility
would  be  that  the  adoption  of the  "two  nos"  policy  affects  the  outcome  achieved  in  land  rental
markets,  e.g.  by  systematically  reducing  the  transaction  costs  associated  with  such  rentals  or  by
allowing for longer-term contracts which  are likely to be more beneficial in terms of efficiency.  In line
with such importance of land transfer rights to achieve efficient  allocation of land among households,
we would also expect that with better land transfer rights, households  would be more  in favor of the
"two  nos"  policy  because,  with  such  rights,  market  mechanisms  can  substitute  for  administrative
reallocation.
The policy variables  included in the preference  regression  support the hypothesis  of a  strong learnig
effect.  Adoption  of the  two nos policy in Guizhou  is a clear example;  as illustrated in column  (1),  a
simple  regression  suggests  that  adoption  of  the  two  nos  policy  at  the  village  level  increases  a
household's  propensity to have this policy choice  as its first preference  by almost  12%. Having  land
use certificates  at the village-level  further increases this probability by  17%. As can easily be venfied
in column  (2) of table  1, this large learning effect does not depend on the specification chosen;  even if
the "two nos" variable which may be endogenous  is dropped,  the Guizhou  dunmmy emerges  as highly
significant,  suggesting that,  after controlling for all other factors, household  preference  for the policy
of two  nos  is  14%  higher  in Guizhou  than in  the  other two provinces  while  the  coefficient  on  the
adoption of land  certificates  remains  highly significant.  It is particularly illuminating  to note  that the
combined  learning  effect of adoption  land use  certificates  and a policy of two nos easily  outweighs
any impact of the other variables discussed  earlier. There is clear and strong support  for the policy  of
21 Note the possible  measurement error in this variable.
21quickly  implementing  the  legal  changes  that  have  been  made  already.  The  statistically  highly
significant  and  quantitatively  large  coefficients  on  policy  variables  support  the  hypothesis  that
households leam  about the advantages  of more  stable property rights as  they are being implemented
but  also  suggest  that  the  magnitude  of  such  leaming  is  large  enough  to  offset  those  of  other
characteristics  discussed earlier.
Although results regarding  other policy options  are  not as clear-cut  as  those for the "two nos"  with
respect to some  of the policy-relevant  variables  discussed above,  they coincide with them in so far as
the main  factor leading households to favor redistributive policies is related to household size.  Having
a higher number of children clearly leads households  to favor a big adjustment.  Adoption of the "two
nos" policy,  as well  as  the overall  size of land held,  and the  Guizhou and Yunnan  dummies  are  all
strongly negative  in the case of small adjustment.  Finally, households  who have a land use  certificate
and who have more adult members  are  strongly against a policy of first having  a big adjustment  and
then following the "two nos" policy.
Taken  together,  results  from  households'  preferences  regarding  the  two  nos  policy  lead  to  three
conclusions.  First,  as  overall  income  levels  and  access  to  mechanisms  to  smooth  consumption
increase,  support for the two nos policy is likely to grow. Second,  most of the resistance  to the policy
of the "two nos" comes from households  who experienced  a population change and apparently expect
that such administrative intervention  would help them to reach a new equilibrium.  This suggests that
mechanisms  for land redistribution based on decentralized  market mechanisms do not work well yet,
possibly due to high transaction  costs. Comparing advantages  and disadvantages  of administrative  to
market-based  land reallocation,  in theory  as well as  in practice,  could be of considerable  interest  and
appears  to  be  a  promising  area  for  future  research.  A  third  finding  relates  to  the  significant  and
quantitatively large impact of leaming about the impact of property rights arrangements. This leaming
effect  not  only  casts  doubt  on  the  validity  and  relevance  of studies  that  are  based  merely  on
hypothetical  changes  in  land right  arrangements  but  also suggests  that,  once  introduced,  household
support for more secure land tenure arrangements will actually increase.
2  Even  though we  use  earlier adoption  of the  two no policy,  the  fact  that there  is  very  little time  vanation  in  this  vanable  implies  that
adoption may be correlated with unobservable  village characteristics which would,  for example, have a systematic impact on the payoff from
this policy, prompting  us to estimate the equation both with and without this vanable.
225. Conclusion  and outlook
Use  of data  from an  actual  land policy  experiment  leads to  insights on the equity  and productivity
effects of land rights  arrangements  that are of interest in terms of  policy and point towards a number
of areas for future research.
Even though the results obtained here suggest that the adoption of the "to no" policy was, ex post, not
associated  with  a negative  impact on households'  investment in response  to exogenous  shocks,  there
are  three  areas  where  further research  would  be  of great  interest.  First,  uncovering  the  short-term
fluctuations  caused by exogenous shocks could provide  a great deal of information on the mechanisms
underlying  this  phenomenon  that  might  be  of  broader  policy  relevance.  Even  though  aggregate
investment in the long term may remain stable in response to a shock, whether or not consumption has
to be cut back,  the duration  of such cut-backs,  and the extent to which  they are related to household
characteristics,  will be relevant  for policies aiming to reduce household vulnerability  in more general
terms. Second,  the literature  is very clear that, even if there is no change in investment ex post, policy
changes may lead to ex ante adjustments of asset portfolios which will have a systematic impact on the
returns  households  will be  able  to receive  from  such  assets.  Information  on short  term  changes  in
households'  asset portfolios  can provide  insights  into this  issue.  Finally, the  importance  of transfer
rights for investment suggests that it would be of great interest to explore the  relationshlp between the
adoption of the "two nos" policy  and the extent  to which, by transferring  land to its most productive
use, land markets can improve equity and efficiency at the same time.
A key  concern  of policy-makers  in the  past has  been that,  even though  it may  be  associated  with
economic  benefits,  a modified  property  rights regime would be  opposed by the majority of the rural
population.  This notion was based largely on studies that asked hypothetical  questions  rather than on
exploration  of households'  actual reaction to a policy change and did not account for the complexity of
the situation.  Our results  suggest that such concerns are  unfounded,  for two reasons.  First, we  find a
strong learning effect whereby households in Guizhou, where more secure such rights were introduced
exogenously,  are  much more  in favor  of a  policy  of "two  nos"  than those  in the  remainder  of the
provinces.  Second,  we find that with overall economic  development, household support for this policy
increases  considerably.  Better access  to other mechanisms to insure and smooth consumption,  as well
as increased levels of non-land wealth, are all associated with higher levels of support for the policy of
"two  nos".  Exploring  how  this  would  translate  into  other provinces  is an important  task for  future
research.  Concerning  agricultural  investment,  our  findings  point  towards  a  positive  impact  of the
policy of "two nos" but at the  same time highlight that, in quantitative terms,  allowing transferability
of land rights  is likely to have a bigger  investment-increasing  impact.  This suggests that, to reap the
23full benefits from more secure land rights, such rights need to be transferable and that, even where the
"two nos" have not yet been implemented,  making  land rights  transferable will allow households  to
capture some  investment benefits.23 While this does not obviate the scope for more in-depth research
to  explore  in  greater  detail  some  of  the  mechanisms  underlying  these  results,  it  suggests  that
implementation of a policy that gradually increases  tenure security as well as the transferability of land
will  yield economic  benefits without  obvious negative  social consequence.  Such a policy would thus
appear to be  a logical  extension  of the  initiatives  started with  the adoption  of the  HRS and  geared
towards advancing economic development  in China's rural areas.
D Further evidence on how these policies  might be made comnpatible  with each other would be very useful
24Table 1: Basic characteristics of household  included In  the sample
Province
Total  Guizhou  Hunan  Yunnan
Head's age (years)  45 27  45 96  46 50  42.40
Head's education (years completed)  6 09  6.20  6.10  5.80
No  of personsagel4-60  3.04  3.14  292  2.90
No. of persons age <  14  0 93  0.96  0.74  1  07
No.  of persons age > 60  0.35  0.35  0.50  0.25
Total earned  income (Y)  5156 52  4832.53  5911  00  5267 33
Per capita earned income (Y)  1235.89  1116.38  1468 07  1319 82
of which agricultural  income(%)  70%  69%  71%  74%
of which non-agncultural  income  30%  31%  29%  26%
Share receiving  remuttances  from fam. Members  44%  42%  60%  33%
Mean amount of remuttances  received (Y)  1179 92  1189.76  1220.56  1080 20
Share of households paying for off-spnng  64%  63%  68%  61%
Mean amount of support given  (Y)  674.56  593.46  884.00  668 56
Source: Own computation from SSB/CCERJWB  2001  Household Survey
25Table 2:  Key village characteristics
Province
Total  Guizhou  Hunan  Yunnan
Total village population  2225.53  1801.92  102101  4405.45
Number of households  54347  417.13  272.85  1109.00
Share of pop. with main  income from agriculture  84%  84%  70%  95%
Share of households > double avg.  land  7%  7%  4%  11%
Share of households <half avg.  land  14%  14%  13%  17%
Households  with children who migrated outside province  24%  24%  42%  8%
Share of households with electncity  98%  99%  99%  97%
Mean  area of total land pre household  (mu)  1 30  1.12  2  09  1.00
Mean  area of paddy land (mu)  0.43  038  0.74  029
Mean  area of upland (mu)  0.54  060  0.31  0.61
Share of households cultivating wasteland  36%  28%  79%  20%
Mean area of wasteland  cultivated  (mu)  0 32  0.14  1.04  0.10
Forest land per capita (mu)  1 27  0.37  3 13  1 77
Share of forest privately held  44%  56%  71%  25%
Gini coefficient of per capta total land  0.44  0.40  0.46  0.39
Gini coefficient of per capita paddy land  0.52  0.50  0.40  0.66
Gmi of the  income distribution  0.48  0.48  0 50  0 49
Source: Own  computation from SSB/CCER/WB  2001 Household Survey
26Table 3: Land rights, land distribution, and land rental in the sample
Province
Total  Guizhou  Hunan  Yunnan
Village  level
No action taken on population  increase  73%  93%  43%  48%
No action taken on population decrease  68%  86%  43%  43%
Land rental allowed (village leaders)  64%  68%  79%  39%
Share with certificate  92%  98%  69%  98%
Land rental allowed (individual level)  90%  87%  95%  91%
Households'  preferred land policy
"Two nos" policy  41%  45%  28%  43%
Large adjustment and then"two nos"  21%  23%  14%  21%
Continuing small adjustments  29%  24%  44%  28%
Continuing large scale adjustments  10%  7%  14%  13%
Source  Own computation from SSB/CCER/WB  2001  Household  Survey
27Table 4: Investment in physical  and human capital; coping  strategies
Province
Total  Guizhou  Hunan  Yunnan
Investment in physical  and human capital
Share of households investing in agncultural enterprise assets  32%  33%  36%  24%
Share of hhs investing in non-ag. enterpise  assets  9%  10%  9%  8%
Share of hhs investing in housing and consumer goods  65%  65%  62%  68%
Mean value of ag. Investment. Cash (land and draft animal)  340.82  483.19  487.89  716.54
Mean value of consumer goods/housing  investment:  Cash  3695 26  3066.62  2645.09  5901.21
Mean value of non-ag  enterprise investment:  Cash  732.36  739.94  416.07  954.39
Share of villages  investing in agncultural infrastructure  40%  31%  54%  52%
Mean education level of cohort bom in 80 - 85  5.13  5.5  5.8  4.1
Head migrated outside  of own county  7%  7%  10%  3%
Children migrated  outside of own county  24%  24%  42%  8%
Shocks  and coping strategies
Number of people to borrow 1000-5000 Y  2 09  2.36  1.75  1.72
Share of households expenencing a small shock (> 1000 Y)  33%  29%  39%  32%
Cope through borrowing  or help by friends  61%  62%  56%  63%
Cope through mugration  35%  36%  39%  30%
Cope through reduced consumption/disinvest  4%  2%  6%  7%
Share of households experiencing a big shock (> 5000 Y)  10%  7%  19%  8%
Cope through borrowing  or help by friends  63%  63%  57%  72%
Cope through mugration  33%  37%  34%  22%
Cope through reduced consumption/disinvest  5%  0%  9%  6%
Source. Own computation  from SSB/CCERIWB 2001  Household Survey
28Table 5.  Determinants of Household Level  Agricultural Investment
Probit  Tobit
Agnc  Investment dummy  Amount of Agnc.  Investment (log)
Village investment dummy  0.939  0.963*  4.676  5  237
(1.87)*  (1.91)  (1.35)  (1.49)
Lagged agric. invest. (dummy/amount)  -0.237  -0.258***  -o  607***  -o 609***
(-2.37)  (-2.58)  (-4.24)  (4 28)
Village adopted Two Nos  0.349**  1  979*
(2.26)  (1  80)
Households with land certificate  0.302  0.238  1.549  1.304)
(1.41)  1.160  (1.03)  (0 91)
Household with land transfer right  0.884***  0.746**  -5  212**  4.473**
(-2.75)  (-2.33)  (-2.30)  (-1  99)
Head's max education  0.014  0.013  0.199  0.1910
(0.90)  (0.79)  (1.76)*  (1.69)
Past migration by head  -0.193  -0.196  -1.196  -1  216
(-I  28)  (-1.29)  (-1.13)  (-I  15)
Migration by children  -0.246**  -0.246**  -I 461*  -1.481*
(-2.19)  (-2.19)  (-1.86)  (-I  88)
Age of household head  0 004  0.003  0.034  0 029
0.73  (0.56)  (0.89)  (0 75)
No. of household members >60  0.199**  0.194**  1.492**  1  490**
(2.17)  (2.14)  (2  37)  (2  38)
No. of household  members <14  0.087  0081  0703  0683
(I  38)  (1.28)  (I 57)  (1.54)
No. of householdmembers  14-60  0  149***  0.147***  1 189***  1 180**
(3.34)  (3 31)  (3  79)  (3  77)
Per capita paddy land  0.220**  0.249**  1.705**  1  877***
(2.06)  (2.29)  (2  40)  (2  60)
Per capita upland  -0.095  -0.105  -0.388  -0.451
(-1.10)  (-1.21)  (-0 63)  (-0 73)
Per capita other land  0.101***  0.121***  0695***  0.830***
(3.53)  (3.61)  (3.49)  (3  50)
Guizhou dummy  0.433**  0.380*  2.812*  2  657*
(2.08)  (1.91)  (1.92)  (1.88)
Yunnan dummy  -0.076  -0.023  -0 783  -O  443
(-0.48)  (-0.14)  (-0.69)  (-0.38)
Constant  -2.238***  -2.388***  -15.837***  -17.129***
(-3.57)  (-3.60)  (-3  52)  (-3 58)
Observations  944  922  944  922
Log-liklihood  -558.20  -557.22  -1280.93  -1280.11
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
*  significant  at 10%; **  significant  at 5%;  ***  significant at 1%
29Table 6. Determinants of Human Capital Investment  in Children's Education
Dependent variable. Years of Schooling Completed byl 1-15 year old children
Large shock (>Y 5,000)  Small shock (Y  1,000 - 5,000)
Male dummy  0.435***  0.431***  0.413**  0.432***
(2.72)  (2.71)  (2.57)  (2.73)
Head migration dummy  -0.311 *  -0.359**  -0.331 *  -0.371**
(1.73)  (2.00)  (1.82)  (2.07)
Children Migration dummy  -0.069  -0.059  -0.110  -0 047
(0.36)  (0.31)  (0.58)  (0.25)
Per capita paddy land  0.364  0.387  0.412  0.680**
(1.31)  (1.40)  (1.43)  (2.22)
Per capita upland  0.188  0.203  0.274  0.258
(0.74)  (0.81)  (1.09)  (1.03)
Per capita other land  -0.081  -0.070  -0 094  -0.109
(0.97)  (0.84)  (1.11)  (1.32)
Parents'  yearsofeducation  0.124***  0.122***  0.127***  0120***
(3 65)  (3.62)  (3.73)  (3.55)
Experienced shock (yi)  -0.677**  -1.449***  -0.116  -I.034***
(1.98)  (2.63)  (0.65)  (2 68)
Guizhou  dummy*shock  (T2)  1.934**  0.887*
(2.44)  (I  89)
Yunnan dummy*shock  (y3)  0.429  1.473***
(0.50)  (3.11)
Guizhou dummy  -0.165  -0.281  -0.155  -0.343
(0.78)  (1.30)  (0.72)  (1.45)
Yunnan dummy  -0.713***  -0.761***  -0.718***  -1.095***
(2.78)  (2.94)  (2.77)  (3.84)
Constant  3.634***  3.680***  3.565***  3.700***
(10.83)  (10.99)  (10.60)  (11.05)
No. of observations  258  258  258  258
R-squared  0.43  0.45  0.42  0.45
Test for net effect  of shock by province:a
r,+r2=0 (2.25)**  (0.86)
ri+y3=0  (0.15)  (1.29)
Absolute value of robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at  10%; **  significant at 5%;  ***  significant at 1%
' Test statistic reported is the t-value.
Note:  Age dummies included but not reported
30Table 7. Tobit regression  of investment in non-agricultural business assets  and Consumer Durables (log)
Small  shock  Big shock
Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit
Education (years)  0.362***  0 354***  0.325***  0.318***
(3.76)  (3.67)  (3.32)  (3 24)
Head migration dummy  0.918  0.954  1.320  1.303
(1.12)  (1.17)  (1.59)  (I 56)
Child migration dummy  0.790  0.689  0.632  0.615
(1.26)  (1.09)  (0 99)  (0 96)
Age of household head  -0.  115***  -0. 116***  -0. 115***  -0  117***
(3.86)  (3.90)  (3.81)  (3.85)
No. ofhh members>60  1.445+**  1.395***  1.110**  1 113**
(2.97)  (2.87)  (2.25)  (2.25)
No.ofhhmembers<14  0.849***  0.801**  0886e**  0885***
(2.65)  (2.50)  (2.71)  (2.71)
No. of hh members b/w 14 &  60  0.754***  0.751'**  0.690***  0 694***
(3.01)  (3.00)  (2.70)  (2.72)
Per capita paddy land  0 631  0.712  0.593  0.609
(1.05)  (I  19)  (0.97)  (1.00)
Per capita upland  -0.286  -0.402  -0.506  -0.513
(0.59)  (0.82)  (1.01)  (I  03)
Per capita other land  0.145  0.156  0.126  0.125
(0.59)  (0.64)  (0.49)  (0.48)
Household  experienced  shock (yi)  -4.792***  -7.787***  -6.168***  -7.673***
(8.53)  (6.41)  (5.88)  (4  17)
Yunnan dummy * Shock (Y2)  4.078**  2.581
(2 52)  (0 92)
Guizhou dummy * Shock (y3)  3.702***  2  106
(2 64)  (0.88)
Yunnan dummy  2.627***  1.196  2.392***  2 139**
(3.07)  (1.17)  (2.74)  (2.35)
Guizhou dummy  1.354*  0.074  1.239*  1.032
(1.84)  (0.09)  (1.66)  (I 33)
Constant  -1.162  0.175  -1.565  -1.270
(0.66)  (0.10)  (0.86).  (0.69)
Observations  1001  1001  1001  1001
Log-likelihood  -1907.61  -1903.43  -1926  91  -1926  36
Test for net effect of shock by province:a
YI+Y2=
0 0.88  0.90
yf+Y3=O  6.18***  0.00
Y2-Y3=
0 0.40  0.02
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%/  o;  significant at 1%,
a  Test statistic reported  is the t-value.
31Table 8. Probit Regressions  for Farmer's Preferences over Alternative Land Policies
Preferred land  policy
Two Nos  Small  One Big adj't,  Big adjustment
adjustment  then Two Nos  continuing
Village adopted two nos  0.1 19**  -0.1 12***  0.028  0.011
(2 57)  (2.60)  (0.76)  (0 45)
Housholds with land certificate  -0.062  -0.020  0.079*  -0.000  0.019
(1.22)  (0 43)  (1.79)  (0.01)  (0.70)
Villagehasrighttorent  0 169**  0.191***  0.028  -0  199***  -0.025
(2.40)  (2.78)  (0.48)  (3.13)  (0.69)
Share of income from agric.  0.154**  0.159**  -0 028  -0.071  0.005
(2 43)  (2 53)  (0.48)  (I 48)  (O  16)
Per capita income (log)  0.068***  0.069***  -0.012  -0.016  -0.008
(2.69)  (2.75)  (0.51)  (0.86)  (0.56)
No. of children migrated out  0.030**  0.029**  0.011  -0.042***  -0.005
(2.16)  (2  11)  (0.84)  (3 18)  (0.58)
Remittance from family member  0.028  0.027  -0.029  -0.012  -0.011
(0 69)  (0 67)  (0.78)  (0.37)  (0 50)
No. of members  10-14 years old  -0.045*  -0.042*  0 003  0.007  0.033***
(1.85)  (1.75)  (0.16)  (0.43)  (2.77)
No. of members  14-60 years old  0.031**  0.031**  0.002  -0.020*  -0.011
(2.17)  (2.15)  (0.14)  (1.74)  (1.23)
No. of memebers >60 years old  0.062**  0.060**  -0.032  -0.014  -0.027
(2.12)  (2.06)  (1.23)  (0.59)  (I 50)
Per capita total land used  0.023*  0.020  -0 032**  0.015  -0 013
(1.79)  (1.59)  (2.24)  (I  54)  (1.51)
P.c.paddy land rel.  to vil. Mean  0.003  0.003  0.004  -0.007  -0.002
(0 51)  (0.47)  (0 70)  (0 69)  (0.47)
P.c.upland rel.  to vil.  mean  -0.019*  -0.016  0.004  0.006  0.007
(1.84)  (1.60)  (0.45)  (0 76)  (1.60)
Household able to  borrow money  0.006*  0.006*  -0.003  -0.001  0.001
between  1000 and 5000 yuan
(1.89)  (1.94)  (1.06)  (0.35)  (1.30)
dummy of rent-in  -0.122**  -0  120**  0.051  0067  0.020
(2.35)  (2 28)  (I  08)  (1.58)  (0.73)
number of plots  0.005  0.007  0.003  -0 013***  0.000
(1.01)  (I  43)  (0.67)  (3.01)  (0.15)
Guizhoudummy  0068  0.123**  -0.148***  0 158***  -0.074**
(1.28)  (2.51)  (3.07)  (3.30)  (2.47)
Yunnandummy  0.100  0.121*  -0.115**  0.131**  -0.007
(1.56)  (1.91)  (2.20)  (2 18)  (0.23)
Observations  956  956  956  956  956
Log-likelihood  -604.99  -608.36  -556.59  -454.79  -293.70
Observations  962  962  962  962  962
Log-likelihood  -615.77  -611.27  -562.60  -460.70  -294 96
Robust z-statistlcs  in parentheses
* significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%;  significant at  1%
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